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ANOTHER LOOK AT 401(K) PLAN
INVESTMENTS IN EMPLOYER
SECURITIES
SUSAN J.

STABILE*

In 1998, I published an article in the Yale Journal on
Regulation entitled, Pension Plan Investments In Employer
Securities: More Is Not Always Better.! I argued in that article for
more regulation of investments in employer securities by pension
plans, particularly 401(k) plans, on the grounds that significant
accumulations of employer stock by pension plans leads to
insufficient diversification of employee's retirement portfolios. I
also argued that an excessive accumulation of employer securities
insulates managers from hostile takeovers and shareholder
proposals.! The article was published during a sustained period of
rising stock values3 and it received little attention. It was not
until the fall of Enron, and reports of the staggering losses to
Enron employee 401(k) plan account balances,4 that I started
receiving phone calls and e-mails from Senate staffers, reporters,
and even 401(k) plan administrators telling me how interesting
they found the article.
A lot has happened since 1998, but nothing has changed my
conviction that more regulation of 401(k) plan investments in
employer securities is warranted, and that such regulation must
involve more than disclosure and education. This Article explores
Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; Adjunct
Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. J.D. 1982,
New York University School of Law; B.A. 1979, Georgetown University.
*

1. Susan J. Stabile, Pension Plan Investments in Employer Securities:
More is Not Always Better, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 62 (1998).

2. Id. at 90-106.
3. See Patrick McGeehan, Wall St. Isn't Expecting Much Exuberance,
Irrational or Otherwise, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001, at Cll (comparing the

more recent sluggish stock market with the activity level of 1999 through
2000). See also Michael Lewis, Five Lessons From the Internet Boom-and-Bust

Commentary, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 11, 2000, at 1 (discussing reasons for
rising stock market during second half of 1990s); Interview by Margaret
Warner with Gail Dudack of UBS Securities, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer:
Strength in Numbers; High-Tech Workers (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 3,

1998) (noting S&P 500 stocks traded at "record multiples" and stating the
valuation in 1998 was unprecedented).
4. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing losses suffered

by investing employees).
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the bases for that conviction and expands on some of the ideas
introduced in my earlier article. The value of engaging in that
exploration at this point in time is clear. Congress is in the process
of considering 401(k) pension plan reform in the wake of the Enron
debacle,5 and the approach favored by the Republican House of
Representatives centers on improved disclosure and investor
education. 6 While many (including myself) are pessimistic that
any legislation will pass this year,7 passion for pension reform has
been ignited and Congress will surely enact legislation this year or
next. In doing so, it is important that Congress not limit itself to
steps that give the appearance of reform but that will accomplish
little.
Part I of the Article discusses employer securities' heavy role
in 401(k) plans and the risks they create. Part II explores the
reasons for such heavy investments in employer securities by
401(k) plan participants and discusses why, given those reasons,
improved disclosure and education alone is not a sufficient
response to the risks. Part III explains why ERISA's fiduciary
standards do nothing to improve the situation.
This Article does not evaluate the arguments advanced by
employers and others in favor of employee stock ownership, a
subject worthy of its own separate treatment.8 For purposes of
this Article, I accept the notion that there are some benefits to
encouraging employee stock ownership. What troubles me is
attempting to achieve those benefits at the expense of employees'
5. Since December 2, 2001, the date on which Enron filed for bankruptcy,
at least twenty different bills have been introduced in the House and Senate to
effect reform of 401(k) plan regulation. See SUSAN J. STABILE, 401(K) SPECIAL

SUPPLEMENT: LESSONS FROM ENRON appendix E (Aspen forthcoming 2002).
6. On April 11, 2002, the House passed the Pension Security Act of 2002.
See H.R. 3762, 107th Cong. § 213(a)(1)(A)(iii), § 104 (g)(1) (2002) (requiring all
employers to provide participants with a quarterly benefits statement). The
bill would also provide for a prohibited transaction exemption to allow the

provision of investment advice by third party service providers to plans, as
well as providing 401(k) plan lockdowns. The bill would also restrict how long

employers can force employees to hold stock contributed as a matching
contribution. Id. See also S. 1992, 107th Cong. § 201 (2002) (requiring the
company to provide accurate investment information and to issue quarterly
benefit statements).

7. The leading House and Senate bills, H.R. 3762 and S. 1992, are very far
apart and reflect real political differences in approach. That, along with the
fact that 2002 is an election year, make it very unlikely that compromise will

be reached in the short term.
8. I have engaged in some evaluation of those claims, both in my earlier
article on this subject and in testimony before the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee in February of this year. See Stabile, supra note 1, at 7378; Retirement Insecurity: 401(k) Crisis at Enron, Hearings before the Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee 107th Cong. (Feb. 5, 2002) (testimony of
Susan

J.

Stabile),

020502stabile.htm.

available

at

http://www.senate.gov/-gov-affairs/

Another Look At 401(k) Plan Investments

2002]

retirement security.
I.

EMPLOYER SECURITIES IN

401(K)

PLANS

A growing emphasis on employee stock ownership has
accompanied the movement toward a shareholder wealth
maximization view of the corporation.9 Employers and investors
believe that stock ownership by employees enhances worker
productivity and motivation by giving employees a stake in the
company's performance, thus aligning their interests with
shareholders' interests. As a secondary motive, managers favor
employee stock ownership because stock held by employees is
viewed as stock held in friendly hands."°
An employer security stock fund in a 401(k) plan is a common
means of putting stock in the hands of rank-and-file employees.
Most large public companies' 401(k) plans have an employer
security stock fund as one of the available investment options,"
and employees directing their 401(k) plan contributions can invest

9. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability
and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 403, 405
(2001) (discussing broad acceptance of the notion that "shareholders alone are
the raison d'etre of the corporation"); Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing
the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 848 (1989)
(discussing notion of "shareholder primacy").
10. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, REPORT ON EMPLOYER STOCK IN

401(K) PLANS 3 (Feb. 28, 2002) (discussing employer beliefs regarding value of
employee holdings of company stock); David Leonhardt, Sweetening Pensions
at a Cost to Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, at § 3, p. 4 (discussing reasons
employers like employees to hold company stock); Robert Luke, Workers Still
Want Company Stock Despite Enron Fall, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 1, 2002,
at 1C (citing President of 401(k) Association regarding employer expectation
that employees with ownership stake are more loyal and productive, and that
senior management likes stock in friendly hands). The merits of both of these
positions can be debated. See, e.g., Maya Kroumova, Investment in Employer
Strock Through 401(k) Plans: Is There Reason For Concern? 111-21 (2002)
(Unpublished Graduate School Dissertation, New Brunswick, on file with the
author) (summarizing findings regarding effect of plan investments in
company stock on productivity and noting own finding of no significant impact
on company performance); David Millon, Enron and the Dark Side of Worker
Ownership, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUSTICE (forthcoming 2002) (exploring
negative aspects of claims supporting employee ownership). However, as I
have indicated, for purposes of the present discussion, I will accept the
proposition that there are values to employee stock ownership.
11. See Patrick J. Purcell, The Enron Bankruptcy and Employer Stock in
Retirement Plans, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, Jan. 22, 2002, at 3 (citing
findings that 55% of plans offer employer stock as an investment option). See
also Jack L. VanDerhei, Company Stock in 401(k) Plans: Results of a Survey of
ISCEBS Members, EBRI SPECIAL REPORT, Jan. 31, 2002, at 4 (noting that
48% of respondents had a company stock options, and that those having
options tend to be the largest plans). Because large plans are more likely than
small ones to offer an employer stock fund, 75% of participants are in plans
offering an employer stock fund. Id. at 10.
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any or all of their contributions in employer stock." Additionally,
many
companies
automatically
invest
any
matching
contributions"3 in employer securities, 4 and often these companies
impose long waiting periods before allowing employees to switch
matching contributions into another investment alternative.' 5
As a result, many 401(k) plans are heavily invested in
employer securities. Indeed, participants in 401(k) plans offering
an employer stock option invest an average of 30-40% of their plan
assets in company stock, 6 and at many companies, these

12. Plans containing a company stock fund generally allow participants to
invest all, or any part, of their contributions in employer stock. Only 14% of
plans impose any limits on the acquisition of company stock. Purcell, supra
note 11, at 4.
13. Ninety-one percent of 401(k) plan participants are in plans with
matching contributions. See Sarah Holden & Jack L. VanDerhei, Contribution
Behavior of 401(k) Plan Participants, ICI PERSPECTIVES, Oct. 2001, at 2
(regarding reasons employer provide matching contributions).
See also
Richard J. Kovach, A Critique of SIMPLE - Yet Another Tax-Favored
Retirement Plan, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 401, 402 n.13 (1998) (suggesting
'employers sometimes make matching contributions to encourage [R&F]
employees to elect deferrals sufficient to permit highly compensated employees
to maximize their elective deferrals under this rule").
14. See Purcell, supra note 11, at 3-4 (noting that 45% of plans with an
employer stock option require that all matching contributions be invested in
company stock). See also VanDerhei, supra note 11, at 5 (noting that 43% of
companies with a company stock option require matching contributions to be
invested in company stock); Theo Francis, Company Stock Fills Many
Retirement Plans Despite the PotentialRisks to Employees, WALL ST. J., Sept.
11, 2001, at C1 (noting that many employers match employee 401(k)
contributions with company stock and providing Gillette, Abbott Laboratories,
and Coca-Cola as examples of such companies); Jim Davenport, When All the
Eggs are in the Company Basket, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 14, 1995, at 3C (reporting
finding of Buck Consultants that 18% of all companies surveyed, and 40% of
the largest companies surveyed, matched contributions with employer stock).
Aside from the desire to put stock in friendly hands, companies view matches
in company stock as desirable from a tax and a cash flow standpoint. U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 10, at 3. See also Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Employees, Pensions and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1519,
1556 (1997) (noting the common practice of employer matching employer
stocks at a discount as an incentive that works to the employers' benefit, but
because it increases the concentration, it will reduce average returns and
increase the risks to the employee).
15. See Purcell, supra note 11, at 6 (noting that 34% of companies that
match in company stock require participants to reach a certain age - typically
50 or 55 - before they can sell the stock). See also VanDerhei, supra note 11,
at 5 (noting that 60% of companies matching in company stock restrict sales
until a specified age and/or service requirement is met).
16. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., The Dangerin a One-Basket Nest Egg Prompts a
Call to Limit Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2001, at C1 (noting that among plans
permitting investment in company stock, 32% of plan assets are invested in
that option and that in situations where employer mandates that match be
made to employee's stock fund, more than 50% of plan assets are so invested).
See also Vickie L. Bajtelsmit & Jack L. VanDerhei, RISK AVERSION AND
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investments are closer to 80% or 90%.17 According to a recent
study of the approximately 23 million participants in plans
offering company stock, 10.6 million participants have account
balances that are more than 20% invested in company stock. 8 The
10.6 million breaks down as follows: 3 million participants hold 2140% of their account balance in company stock; 2.3 million
participants hold 41-60% of their account balance in company
stock; and 5.3 million participants hold in excess of 60% of their
account balance in company stock. 9 Even more distressing is that
low-wage workers - those least likely to have adequate alternative
sources of retirement income - are "three to four times as likely to
have 80% or more of their plan assets invested in company stock
than higher-wage workers."2
In contrast to executives whose
primary holdings in employer stock come from stock options and
bonus stock, rank-and-file employees primarily own company stock
through their 401(k) plan accounts. 2'
PENSION INVESTMENT CHOICES IN POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-

FIRST CENTURY 45, 57 (Michael S. Gordon et al. eds., 1997) (finding 41-42%
invested in employer securities); Virginia Munger Kahn, The Perils of
Company Stock for Retirement, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1997, § 3, at 6 (discussing
employee investment); PENSION & BEN. DAILY REPORT, Jan. 18, 2002
(reporting IOMA study of 219 plans that found 25 to be more than 60%
invested in company stock).
17. See Francis, supra note 14, at C1 (providing as examples of companies
with heavy 401(k) plan accumulations of employer securities: Abbott
Laboratories (90%); Pfizer, Inc., (85%); Anheuser-Busch Co. (82%); and Dell
Computer Corp. (88%)). See also Managing 401(k) Plans, IOMA, Oct. 2001, at
3 (noting Proctor & Gamble and Sherwin Williams as examples of companies
with more than 90% of 401(k) plan assets in employer securities and noting
seven other plans with assets of at least 80% in employer securities). See also
Francis, supra (reporting result of study of Institute of Management and
Administration finding that the 401(k) plan assets of one in five companies is
at least 50% invested in company stock); Managing 401(k) Plans, supra at 3
(noting that 30 of the plans tracked by IOMA have 60% or more of the assets
invested in company stock).
18. Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Utkus, Company Stock and Retirement
Plan Diversification 18 (Pension Research Council Working Paper 2002-4 Apr.
2002) available at http://prc.wharton.upenn.edu/prc/PRC/WP/WP2002-4pdf.
19. Id.
20. Gordon P. Goodfellow & Sylvester J. Schieber, Investment of Assets in
Self-Directed Retirement Plans, in POSITIONING PENSIONS FOR THE TWENTY-

FIRST CENTURY 67, 86 (Michael S. Gordon et al. eds., 1997).
21. It is true that the number of employees who have been granted stock
options by their employers has grown from about one million in 1992 to about
ten million today. See National Center for Employee Ownership, Employee
Stock Options Fact Sheet, at http://www.nceo.org/libarry/optionfact.html
(reporting that up to 10 million employees receive stock options). According to
a 1999 survey by William M. Mercer, 39% of large firms granted options to at
least one-half of their employees in 1999 compared to 17% in 1993. See
Margaret M. Engel, Update on Trends in Stock Option and Long-Term
Incentive Plans, ACA J., July 1, 1999, at 4248 (citing a study by William
Mercer). Whereas executives have the bulk of their stock ownership through

The John Marshall Law Review

[35:539

Because most Americans fail to accumulate significant
retirement savings apart from their employer-sponsored pension
plans2 and because the future reliability of Social Security is in
doubt, 2 it is important that employer-sponsored pension plan
savings be sufficiently diversified to minimize losses of retirement
income. Concentrating a significant portion of retirement savings
into a single company stock creates a tremendous risk to a
participant's
retirement security.24
Investment advisers
options and bonus-stock and only a small percentage through their 401(k)
plan, for rank-and-file workers the situation is reversed.
22. Americans' savings rate is generally so low that such funds are vastly
insufficient to afford a comfortable retirement. See, e.g., Lewis Keller, Sound
Investment Policies for an Aging Population,SAN FRAN. Bus. TIMES, July 19,
1996, at C3, available at 1006 WL 10042468 (noting that although a retiree
needs $1 million in savings to generate $50,000 a year in retirement income,
three out of four workers in 1996 admit that their savings are inadequate);
Diane E. Lewis, New To The Workforce? Start Savings Plan Now, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 9, 1996, at C3 (reporting a 1995 Rand Corporation study finding
that the rate of savings among Americans has dropped to 4% of annual income
in 1993 from 6.4% in 1959); Good Savings Habits Can Never Start Too Soon
for Your Child, TAMPA TRIB., July 17, 1996, at 7 (reporting Commerce
Department figures for the first quarter of 1996 showing that Americans save
less than 4% of every dollar, in comparison to 15.3% in Japan and 8.3% in
Canada). The reality is that most workers find it difficult to accumulate
personal savings for retirement benefits because "their paychecks are used to
meet the demands of day-to-day living expenses." Democratic Leadership
Introduces Clinton's Pension Reform Package, BNA PENSIONS & BENEFITS
DAILY, May 28, 1996, at 23 (quoting Sen. Thomas A. Daschle). [herinafter,
"Clinton'sPension Reform"].
23. U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT)Holds Hearings on Enron 401(k)
Plans: HearingsBefore the Senate GovernmentalAffairs Comm., 107th Cong. 5
(2002) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman concerning hearing on Enron
401(k) plans, stating, "[wlith the concerns about the long-term stability of the
Social Security fund and personal savings rates at just 1.1 percent, which is a
historical low, we really need to get 401(k) reform right.") [hereinafter "Senate
Enron Hearings"]. See also Jonathan Riskind, Deficit Could Hurt Fix for
Medicare, Social Security, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 28, 2002, at 1A
(noting that by 2025 the cost to keep the trust would be $579 billion per year);
Keller, supra note 22, at C3 (reporting a 1995 Rand Corporation study
reporting that the Social Security Administration is in such bad shape it
might not be around in 50 years); Hearings before the Senate Finance
Committee on Social Security and Family Policy, 106th Cong. 1 (Mar. 25,
1996) (testimony of Olivia A. Mitchell) (citing projection of Social Security
trustees that Social Security tax revenue will be less than currently-legislated

benefits after the year 2013, and that the Social Security trust fund will be
depleted by 2030). In any event, Social Security alone, which provides an
average of 40% of pre-retirement income, does not provide sufficient
retirement income. See Clinton's Pension Reform, supra note 22, at 23.
24. See Shlomo Benartzi, Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of
401(k) Accounts to Company Stock, 55 J. OF FIN. 1747, 1747 (2001) (citing

Brennan and Torous findings that "the certainty equivalent of investing one
dollar in a single stock over a 10-year period is only 36 cents"); Mitchell &
Utkus, supra note 18, at 2 (noting that a defined contribution plans with
concentrated company stock holdings will produce lower median wealth than a
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recommend that "company stock should account for as little as 5%
but no more than 20% of a plan's total assets. Some say company
stock should not be in a 401(k) plan at all."25
Insufficient diversification of 401(k) assets may not be so
much of a problem for executives of a company, who tend to have a
relatively small percentage of their retirement portfolio bound up
in their plan. A company's highest paid officers may receive in
excess of 50% of their total pension benefits from nonqualified
plans.2 6
However, rank-and-file employees depend almost
exclusively on their 401(k) plan to accumulate retirement savings.
It is important in this context to realize that defined contribution
plans were once viewed as supplemental retirement vehicles, a
401(k) plan is the sole source of employer-sponsored retirement
income for many employees and the primary source for many
others.27

system of diversified investments). RiskMetrics, a software analytics company

has found that weighing all the Dow Jones stocks, a 1/3 holding in a 401(k)
plan in a single stock would produce an average 21% more risk than a portfolio
that reflected the overall market and that concentrated holdings in NASDAQ
stocks pose an even greater risk. See Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Collapse;
Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
2002, § 1, at 1 (describing Enron employees' stories of financial loss). It may be
that at any given time, concentrated holdings in certain individual stocks do
not pose a greater risk than a diversified portfolio. However, not only is it
difficult to predict which those companies will be, but over time, most stocks
will suffer a serious downturn. See Luke, supra note 10, at 1C (noting that
every stock, given a 20-30 year time period, will decrease 20%). Thus,
depending on the age of the participant when the fall occurs, the participant
will not be able to wait for a recovery.
25. Susan Strother Clarke, Area Workers' 401(k)s Bet on Employer Stock,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 3, 2002, at Al. See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 18,
at 2 (noting that the "risks of company stock are not limited to plans or
accounts with high current levels of concentration," and observing that stock
concentrations will be low in the plan of a company whose stock has performed
poorly over a long period, "yet participants will have suffered real economic
losses due to a gradual decline in a stock's value").
26. Kenneth A. Kirk & William J. Bowden, Finding and Fixing "Broken"
Nonqualified Plans, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS J., Dec. 1, 2001, at 16.
27. Susan J. Stabile, PaternalismIsn't Always a Dirty Word: Can the Law
Better Protect Defined Contribution Plan Participants?,5 EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
AND EMP. POLICY J. 491, 496 (2001). See Clarke, supra note 25, at Al (citing
Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America that 401(k) plans are now the
predominant form of retirement savings, and have largely replaced
conventional pensions). Section 401(k) plans now have about $2 trillion in
assets and cover over 42 million participants. Investment Company Institute,
401(k) Plan Participants:Characteristics,Contributionsand Account Activity,
ICI PERSPECTIVES, Oct. 2001, at 1. Defined contribution plan assets have
outstripped those of defined benefit plans. See Christiane Bird, 401(k)s
Adopting Traditional Pension Plans' Techniques, Dow JONES NEW SERVICE,
Jan. 17, 2002 (noting that defined contribution plans now have $2 trillion in
assets, compared to $1.8 trillion for defined benefit plans). This is a vast
change from the mid 1970s, when defined benefit plan assets stood at about
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Over-investment in employer securities by pension plans is
even more potentially damaging than a general lack of
diversification
in an investment portfolio.
Significant
accumulation of employer securities puts all of one's eggs (present
job security and future retirement security) in a single basket,
which no investment adviser would recommend. This is not a
speculative danger. Anyone who has read the newspaper in recent
months has heard stories about evaporating plan account balances
of employees of companies like Lucent Technologies, Polaroid, and
Enron.'
In hearings before the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee on February 5 of this year, a union representative
testified regarding losses suffered by Enron plan participants,
highlighting the fate of eight employees, who together lost
$2,882,000 as a result of Enron's collapse. 9
A second problem with over-investment in employer securities
by 401(k) plans is that company managers are subject to less
shareholder oversight if large concentrations of company stock are
owned by employees. In fact, employers often include company
stock funds as a 401(k) investment option precisely as a means of
placing large blocks of shares in friendly hands." Employers
believe that employees will be more concerned with current job
security than with the future value of their retirement benefit, and
thus will make voting and tender decisions that favor the current
management's interests."' Employees often have strong feelings of
identification with their employer and "derive psychological or
emotional benefit from making decisions they perceive to be in the
best interests of current management."" At a minimum, employee
shareholders are less likely to challenge management. According
to survey results of the Employee Benefits Research Institute, 64%

$186 billion and defined contribution plan assets at $74 billion. David A.
Pratt, Nor Thyme Nor Reason: Simplifying Defined Contribution Plans, 49
BUFF. L. REV. 741, 750 (2001).
28. See, e.g., Oppel Jr., supra note 16, at C1 (discussing losses suffered by

employees of Lucent, Nortel, Global Crossing and Enron due to heavy
concentrations of accounts in employer securities).
29. Senate Enron Hearings, supra note 23, at 10-12 (testimony of William
D. Miller, business manager and financial secretary for the International

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 125). It is possible to quibble with
the calculation of the loss figures. Some of the figures being cited calculate
loss based on the fall from the highest price at which Enron's stock was
trading. Employees purchased much of their company stock at a price much

lower than that high price, benefiting from the tremendous run up in the price
of the stock during the company's meteoric rise. Nonetheless, by the end of
the day, a large number of Enron employees were left with 401(k) plan

accounts that were essentially wiped out.
30. See Stabile, supra note 1, at 90 (discussing entrenchment impact of plan

investments in employer securities).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 103.
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of surveyed plan participants indicated that they would not vote in
favor of acquisition of their employer by a hostile acquirer even if
doing so would result in a 100% return on their investment."
Thus, both concerns about ensuring adequate retirement
income and corporate governance concerns argue against
overweighting 401(k) plan account balances with employer stock.
The next question is whether improving disclosure and providing
greater education and advice to plan participants will effectively
address those concerns.
II. THE LIMITS OF IMPROVED DISCLOSURE AND EDUCATION
A. Reasons for Heavy 401(k) Plan Investments in Employer
Securities
What explains the significant accumulation of employer
securities in 401(k) plans? Offered the option of investing all or
part of their plan contributions in employer securities, why do so
many employees choose to invest such a large percentage of their
retirement savings in that option? Is it simply that no one has
ever told employees that diversification is important, or is
Several things explain the heavy
something else operating?
investment in employer securities.
Context-Dependence. Behavioral theorists have empirically
demonstrated that the options presented to a decisionmaker and
how those options are presented affect the decisionmaker's choices,
Contexta phenomenon known as "context-dependence. " '
dependence is no less a reality in the context of participant
investment decisions than in other areas. The Employee Benefits
Research Institute (the "EBRI") has found support for the
influence of the options presented to the decisions made by plan
EBRI compared plans offering guaranteed
participants.
investment contracts and employer stock funds with plans offering
only one or the other or neither choice. It found that plans offering
neither option have the highest allocations to equity funds,
whereas the presence of either a GIC fund or an employer stock

33. Employee Benefit Research Institute, Public Attitudes on Employee
Ownership and Benefit Promises, 1994 EBRI/GALLUP REPORT G-54 at 22.
34. See Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich & Amos Tversky, ContextDependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEG. STUD. 287, 288 (1996).
Numerous studies have established that "people's preferences are affected by

the set of options under consideration." Amos Tversky & Itamar Simonson,
Context-Dependent Preferences, 39 MGMT. SCI. 1179, 1187 (1993). I discuss
context-dependence more fully in Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose
Unwisely: Congress' Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participantsto
Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J. OF L. & PUB. POLY 361, 378-86 (2002)
(arguing that context-dependence destroys the theoretical basis for section
404(c) of ERISA).
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fund, but not the other, resulted in substantially lower allocations
to all other funds.35 Professors Benartzi and Thaler have also
illustrated how the options presented to the plan participant affect
decision-making. They conducted a study that found that whether
a investment option is framed as a middle choice or as an extreme
choice affects participants' preference for the option.36 In another
study, they found that the number of investment options offered in
a particular category of investment affected overall allocation of
funds to that investment category. Thus, for example, increasing
the number of equity funds offered resulted in an increase in the
total percentage of a participant's account balance allocated to
equity funds."
Of more relevance to the issue of over-investments in
employer securities, the EBRI study also found that participants
directed a higher percentage of their own contributions to
employer stock in plans that automatically invest a company's
matching contribution in employer securities.'
In these
situations, participants invest 33% of their contributions in
company stock, compared to 22% when the match is not in
employer securities. 0
One explanation for this phenomenon,
referred to by Professor Schlomo Benartzi as an "endorsement
effect," is that participants interpret matches in employer
securities "as an endorsement or as implicit investment advice." °
Since 45% of companies with employer stock funds require
matching fund investment in company stock,4' the potential
endorsement effect is tremendous.
Optimistic Bias. Many employees invest heavily in their
employer's stock because of overconfidence in the employer, which

35. See Susan J. Stabile, The Behavior of Defined Contribution Plan
Participants,77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71, 87 (2002) (discussing the EBRI findings).
36. Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, How Much is InvestorAutonomy
Worth?,
Mar.
2001,
at
18-20,
available
at

http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/richard.thaler/ researchlAutonomy.pdf.
37. Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Na've DiversificationStrategies
in Defined Contribution Savings Plans, 91 AMER. ECON. REV. 79, 89 (Mar.

2001).
38. See Stabile, supra note 35, at 87 (discussing the EBRI findings).
39. See Holden & VanDerhei, supra note 13, at 10 (discussing why
employers provide matching contributions). See also Daniel Altman, Enron's
Collapse: Pensions; Experts Say Diversify, But Many Plans Rely Heavily on
Company Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, § 1, at 26 (noting that participants

invest 47.6% of their contributions in plans requiring a match in employer
securities compared to 20.2% in plans that do not contain such a requirement).

40. Benartzi, supra note 24, at 1752. Professor Benartzi's own studies find
a similar endorsement effect from company matching contributions in other
types of funds. Id. at 1752-54.
41. See Purcell, supra note 14, at 3-4 (noting that according to a study by
Hewitt Consultants, 45% of plans offered by 55% of companies surveyed made
matching contributions exclusively in company stock).
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can be viewed as a version of the optimistic bias.2 This theory
holds that employees think that other companies are more likely
to experience problems than their own. Employees recognize in
the abstract both that diversification of investments is desirable
and that they should be invested in equities. However, they fear
the unknown and feel greater comfort and certainty with their
employer's stock believing it to be less risky than other stocks.43
For example, a Vanguard Group study found that although plan
participants rate individual stocks as more risky than a stock
mutual fund, they consider their own employer's stock as less
risky than a diversified fund."
This overconfidence in the employer may thus be a product of
bounded rationality;45 participants know they lack the ability to
suitably judge the entire array of investment choices so
participants substitute confidence in the employer instead.46
However, in many cases the overconfidence in the employer is the
result of employees excessively extrapolating from past
performance, incorrectly believing that the fact that an employer's
stock has done well in the past means there is less risk in the
future.47
Since the prolonged bull market resulted in many
companies experiencing sustained positive returns, many

42. BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 4 (Cass R. Sunstein, ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2000).
43. See Jim Gardner, ESOP Fables Sometimes Lack a Happy Ending, S.F.
BUS. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997, at 3 (noting that risk of lack of diversification of
investment in employer securities is magnified by the fact that employees
"tend to have rosier views of the prospects for their companies than might be
warranted"). See also Jeffrey M. Laderman, More Gold for Your Golden Years,
BuS. WK., July 3, 1995, at 63 (noting that employees "don't think employer
securities are risky because they understand the company. They think the
stock market is risky because they don't understand it.").
44. See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 18, at 30 (reporting results of 2001
Vanguard Group study and similar findings by a John Hancock 2001 study).
45. Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law & Economics, in BEHAVIORAL LAw & ECONOMICS 14-15
(Cass R. Sunstein, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
46. See, e.g., Robert L. Clark & Madeline B. d'Ambrosio,
Financial
Education and Retirement Savings, TIAA-CREF WORKING PAPERS, (TIAACREF, New York, NY), Feb. 2002, at 13 (writing that most participants have
limited knowledge of financial markets or the risks associated with various
investment options and have little understanding of how much they need to
save); Clarke, supra note 25, at Al (noting that employees feel comfortable
with the company they know); Luke, supra note 10, at 1C (citing Hewitt
Associates Lori Lucas that participants feel overwhelmed by plan choices and
can not determine how various options fit into their portfolio).
47. Professor Benartzi's empirical findings support this conclusion. See
Benartzi, supra note 24, at 1748-49 (stating that employees "conclude that
abnormally high past performance is representative of future performance,
even though stock returns are largely unpredictable"). See also Investment
Company Institute, supra note 27 (reporting that 34% cite company's past
performance as reason for investing in company stock).
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employees came to believe that an investment in their employer's
securities was a sure bet.
Loyalty. Many employees invest heavily in employer stock
because of loyalty to their employers,48 an example of bounded selfinterest.49
Employees feel that they "owe something to the
company" and therefore should invest in company stock." Loyalty
is particularly an issue for women, who make up a growing part of
the workforce,"' but it is by no means limited to women."
Employees testifying during Enron hearings talked about the
culture of employee stock ownership and the feeling of trust in the
company and its leaders that pervaded the work environment."
Pressure. This is a much harder phenomenon to document,
but there is certainly widespread belief that employers engage in
"workplace campaigns to pressure employees to invest their own
money in the company."'
For example, in a press conference
announcing his pension reform bill in March of this year, Senator
Kennedy stated that "the main reason why Enron workers lost
more than a billion dollars is that they were pressured by Enron

48. See Lewis Braham, Institutional Asset Management: The Growing
Number of Options in Qualified Plans is a Boon for Plannersin the Short Run
But Could Spell Trouble in the Long, FIN. PLAN., July 1, 1997, at 7 (explaining
that despite lack of diversification, employees over invest in employer
securities because "often even the most sophisticated employees remain
doggedly loyal to their mother company"). See also Adam Bryant, Betting the
Farm on Company Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1995, § 3, at 1 (stating that for
many employees, the issue is emotional; employees invest heavily in employer
securities even though they say they would never advise a relative to be so
heavily invested in a single stock).
49. See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 45, at 16.
50. Clarke, supra note 25, at Al (quoting Professor Patricia Dilley).
51. See Debora Vrana, Investing with Cash, Hearts and Souls, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 1997, at Al (quoting financial planner Esther Berger's observation
that "women invest with their souls and their hearts rather than their
pocketbooks alone").
52. See Braham, supra note 48, at 7 (giving example of a GM executive
who, despite his participation in all discussions with analysts about the
company's financial prospects, insisted on investing enormous amounts in GM
stock as the stock was falling, thus losing $160,000 of his retirement money).
53. Senate Enron Hearings, supra note 23, at 13-16 (statement of Deborah
G. Perotta, a former senior Administrative Assistant at Enron, referring to
Enron as a family that rewarded employee loyalty and hard work with large
compensation and benefits packages that, in turn, created an "atmosphere of
great pride, trust and respect"). See also Anthony Violante, Enron's Crash
Turned Media 'From Lap Dogs to Attack Dogs, THE BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 15,
2002, at C4 (quoting former Enron employee, single-mother, Helen Matthews
saying "what hurts almost as much [as losing her job] is that working at
Enron was like being part of [a] community. We cared about each other.").
54. Retirement Policy: Industry Groups Cite 401(k) Plan Successes; AFLCIO Says Enron Problems not Isolated, BNA PENSIONS & BENEFITS DAILY,.
Mar. 6, 2002 (citing AFL-CIO Secretary-Treasurer Richard Trumka).
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executives to put all their 401(k) money in company stock. " "
Allegations of employer pressure have also been advanced in
several of the lawsuits recently filed against employers by
participants who have suffered heavy plan losses as a result of
downturns in the employer's stock.56 In addition, practices such as
requiring employees to invest matching contributions in company
stock and offering company stock at a discount to employees57
suggest efforts by employers to influence employees to invest in
employer stock.'
Anecdotal evidence suggests that even where there is no overt
pressure, employees feel that they must invest in company stock in
order to be perceived as loyal to their employer. It was my
experience when I was in law practice that when a company puts a
stock fund in a 401(k) plan, many employees, particularly lowlevel managerial employees, felt pressured to put a lot of their
55. Press Conference, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA), Senator Jeff
Bingaman (D-NM), Senator Jon Corzine (D-NJ) and Senator Barbara Boxer
(D-CA) FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 6, 2002).
56. For example, a lawsuit filed against Lucent Technologies alleges such
manipulation. In Reinhart & Smith v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., Civ. 01-CV3491 (D.N.J. 2001), the complaint alleges that Lucent induced plan
participants to invest in, or continue to invest in, Lucent stock despite the fact
that the company knew of serious business problems that would adversely
affect the value of the stock. A similar such action was brought against Ikon
Office Solutions, and a class certified in 2000. In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc.,
191 F.R.D. 457 (E.D. Pa. 2000). The Ikon litigation was recently settled, with
the company agreeing to make certain changes to its 401(k) plan, including
allowing participants with at least two years of service to invest company
matching contributions in funds other than employer securities. Ikon Settles
ERISA Litigation, BUSINESS WIRE, May 14, 2002. Similarly, allegations
brought by Nortel employees against the company included claims of
misrepresentation and failure to disclose material information. The
allegations also claimed Nortel director's "failure to diversify" contributed to
the risk of large losses. Kauffmann v. Nortel Networks Corp., No. 3-02cv253
(M.D. Tenn. filed Mar. 20, 2002). The recent filing of a class-action lawsuit
against Global Crossing directors brought by the company's employees extends
the claim to the accounting firm for violating the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act by endorsing misleading and false information.
Ghazee v. Winnick, No. 2-02cv070 (C.D. Cal. filed Mar. 14, 2002).
57. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 1555 (suggesting that one of the reasons
so much 401(k) money is invested in employer securities is that employers
often offer stock to employees at a discount).
58. See Mitchell & Utkus, supra note 18, at 31 (noting that employees may
be "encouraged through management promotion of the stock, and possibly
organizational pressure to buy and own shares in the company"). Employers
certainly have an incentive to pressure employees. As one commentator
observed, "If you take a company that has 30,000 or 40,000 employees, and all
of those people are buying the stock, that supports the price and makes the
company look better. A lot of CEOs get paid on the basis of the stock price, so
there's an incentive to do that." Ed Taylor, Pension Groups Worry About
Congressional Interference after Enron, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIB. BUS. NEWS,
Mar. 4, 2002 (quoting James Dew, director, Financial Planning Association).
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plan assets into that investment option. In addition, employees
feel peer pressure from their co-workers to invest in company
stock.5 9
B. Improved Disclosureand Educationare Unlikely to Be
Effective
Many people view 401(k) plan investment as a matter of
individual choice. They reject the notion that any sort of limits
should be placed on participant plan investment activity, instead
favoring efforts to allow participants to make better choices."
ERISA does not require employers to periodically disclose to
401(k) participants their account balances. In fact, the statute
does not actually require disclosure unless the employee makes a
request.6 Any participant who does submit a written request for
information regarding their account balance must be provided
with one. However, ERISA imposes a limit on one request per
year. 2 Despite the lack of a legal mandate, most 401(k) plan
sponsors automatically provide statements on a quarterly or
annual basis. 63
59. See Luke, supra note 10, at 1C (quoting president of 401(k) Association
regarding peer pressure from fellow employees to buy company stock).
60. This inclination comes from a view of plan participants as rational
decisionmakers capable of acting in a manner that will maximize their selfinterest. As expressed in a recent Treasury Department report, 401(k) plans
provide participants with the ability to "choose the tradeoff between risk and
return that suits them best.
It also allows individuals to adjust their
portfolios from one with higher potential returns and higher risk early in their
careers to one that provides smaller but surer returns as they approach
retirement." U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 10, at 2. See also Karen W.
Ferguson, Rewriting the Rules on Retirement: How 401(k)'s Hurt Lower-Paid
Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1986, at C2 (noting that one reason 401(k) plans
are so popular is that "they fit in perfectly with traditional notions of selfreliance and rugged individualism"). However, as I have argued at more
length elsewhere, participant investment decisions are anything but the
product of rational decisionmaking. See Stabile, supra note 35, at 88-92. See
also Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice and Investment
Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23 BERKELEY J. EMPL. &
LAB. L. 1, 18 (2002) (noting that both theory and empirical evidence "indicate
that individual employees face numerous challenges in making investment
allocation decisions"). The other problem with this view, is that it fails to
appreciate the externalities resulting from poor employee plan investment
choices. However, the government heavily subsidizes tax-qualified retirement
plans precisely because there is a societal interest in ensuring adequate
retirement security. If individuals do not retire with sufficient retirement
savings, the government will be forced to provide for them, imposing costs on
society as a whole. See Stabile, supra note 34, at 394.
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2000).
62. Id.
63. See STEVEN J. FRANZ ET AL., 401(K) ANSWER BOOK, 18-18 (Panel
Publishers 2002) (stating that although no provision requires individual
participant statements, "from a practical standpoint, administers of 401(k)
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There is also no requirement that employers provide any
investment education or advice to their plan participants.'
However, despite the fact that the law does not require them to do
so, many employers do provide some type of investment education
to their 401(k) plan participants. 65
Typically this includes
information about the plan's investment options, general
information about financial markets and economic conditions, and
financial education or retirement seminars.6
The leading proposals for 401(k) plan reform focus on
disclosure and education. This is an unfortunate focus if the aim
is true pension reform; improved education is unlikely to be
effective in reducing the concentration of employer securities in
participants' 401(k) accounts.
As a general matter, the
effectiveness of investor education generally is very mixed. While
there is some evidence that education has positive impacts on
participants' participation and contribution rates,68 it is much less
plans will provide such information on an automatic basis at least annually").
See also The Gottesdiener Law Firm Announces Class Action Lawsuit Against
Enron, BUSINESS WIRE, Nov. 26, 2001 [hereinafter, "GottesdienerLaw Firm"]
(quoting Gottesdiener's sentiment that "Congress sensibly placed a 10% limit
on company stock in traditional defined benefit plans back in 1974, but at the
behest of the corporate lobby, it placed no such cap on defined contribution
plans. Today, when workers have been forced to assume virtually all of the
investment risk and responsibility for funding their retirements, having no
such cap is 'completely indefensible").
64. See Stabile, supra note 34, at n. 59 (noting the regulations are silent on
the question of education, but they specifically state that a fiduciary is under
no obligation to provide any investment advice to a participant. See Also 29
C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(c)(4) (2001)).
65. Jacqueline M. Quinn, Mainstreaming Financial Education as an
Employee Benefit, J. FIN. PLAN., May 2000, at 70-71. See also Gary Blau &
Jack L. VanDerhei, Employer Involvement in Defined Contribution Investment
Education, BENEFITS Q., Fourth Quarter 2000, at 84-85 (explaining that
company human resource departments generally educate employees).
66. Clark & d'Ambrosio, supra note 46, at 5. Under current law, employers
are prevented from offering specific investment advice without becoming
fiduciaries and therefore facing liability for losses occasioned by participant
decisions. To avoid fiduciary status, they are limited to providing generalized
information about asset allocation and plan investment choices that do not
sufficiently satisfy employee's need for education. See DOL Interpretive
Bulletin 96-1, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1 (1996). See infra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text (discussing how employers do not offer programs or offer
only limited programs as a result of potential liability).
67. See infra note 6 (discussing congressional proposals in the House and
Senate).
68. James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick,
Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, ParticipantDecisions, and the
Path of Least Resistance, NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES, 5, 28-31 Working
Paper 8655, Dec. 2001, available at http://www.nber.org.papersw8655
(discussing evidence of positive effect on participation and contribution
activity, but criticizing studies). See also Clark & d'Ambrosio, supra note 46,
at 4-5 (discussing studies finding positive effect of education on participation

The John MarshallLaw Review

[35:539

clear that education has a positive impact on participants'
investment behavior. 9 For example, according to a study of
participants by the Investment Company Institute, 60% of
participants in 401(k) plans never make any changes to their
initial contribution and investment decisions." This remains true
even when employees are provided with investment education. In
these instances, plan participants often say that they plan to make
changes to their investment allocation, but very few of them
actually make any changes.71
More importantly, education is particularly unlikely to affect
decisions with respect to investments in employer securities. As
discussed in the previous section, employees invest a significant
portion of their 401(k) account balances in employer securities for
a number of reasons. Although education may positively impact
behavior that is the product of bounded rationality, many of the
behavioral tendencies that result in heavy investments in
employer securities have little to do with lack of financial
sophistication or investment education. For example, so long as
employers continue to make matching contributions in employer
securities, the endorsement effect will cause employees to invest
more of their own contributions in company stock. Similarly,
behavior that is the product of optimistic biases is particularly
resistant to change through educational efforts."2 As one Home
Depot employee who invested his entire 401(k) plan account into

and contribution decisions).
69. See Mind the Gap! Why DC Plans UnderperformDB Plans,and How to
INSIGHTS, Apr. 2000, at 11 (discussing failure of
participant education efforts). See also Worker Investment Decisions: An
Analysis of Large 401(k) Plan Data, at 4-5, 8, 11, & 13 (EBRI Issue B f No.

Fix Them, INVESTMENT

176, Aug. 1996) (discussing study findings that show failure of participants to
invest any plan assets in equities despite participant education efforts);
Jeannie Mandelker, Crossing the Line, CFO MAG., Dec. 1, 1998, at 61
(although employees have received various forms of investment education for
several years, their plan investment decisions have not improved); Gordon,

supra note 14, at 1557 (noting that despite more investment in education
activity being carried on by employers, employees continue to invest too little
in equity securities). But see Muir, supra note 60, at 20-21 (stating that the
method by which employers provide information "will influence the
[employee's] selection of investment vehicles").

70. Investment Company Institute, supra note 27, at 6 See also Colleen E.
Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans Today:
Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 25 & n. 146 (2000)

(citing EBRI findings that many employees change their plan investment
allocations based on educational materials, but that those changes are not
necessarily ones that positively affect account balances).

71. See Choi et al., supra note 68, at 30-31.
72. See generally Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Resistance of
Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions, 14 HEALTH PSYCHOL.

132 (1995) (reporting on the results of several studies that failed to reduce
optimistic biases).
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company stock observed, "I just believe in the company ...I don't
want to really diversify my 401(k)."73
Finally, providing employees with general investment
information and asset allocation models does not get at the root of
their decisions that are the result of emotional and psychological
factors such as loyalty to, and pressure by, the employer. As a
result, even employees who are generally sophisticated and who
appreciate the dangers of excessive investment in a single stock
over-invest in employer securities.74
This over-investment
continues despite attempts to educate employees."
Employers who wish to provide education to their plan
participants without being viewed as fiduciaries responsible for
participants' investment decisions are limited in the types of
advice they can provide. In 1996, the DOL issued an interpretive
bulletin relating to participant investment education7 6 describing
various categories of information and materials that employers
may provide to participants without giving investment advice
within the meaning of ERISA and the DOL's regulations. The
information employers can provide includes plan information,
information about general financial and investment concepts,
asset allocation models providing strategies for obtaining
hypothetical investment objectives, and interactive investment
materials.77
Essentially, the bulletin allows generalized
investment education, but not for individualized investment
advice.
Present law allows employers to provide investment advice
for their employees, so long as independent advisers provide it.
However, very few employers do so. According to a recent survey,
73. Luke, supra note 10, at 1C.
74. Even executives running companies are susceptible to poor judgment

regarding investments in employer securities. The New York Times recently
reported on three chief executive officers whose unwarranted faith in their
companies caused them to tie up significant portions of their wealth in
employer securities, and use those securities to secure large loans. When their
companies failed, they found themselves in deep financial trouble. See Floyd
Norris, 3 Ex-Chiefs Discover Perils of Borrowing and Believing, N.Y. TIMES,
May 16, 2002, at C1.

75. See Ellen Benoit, Too True to be Good, CFO MAG. FOR SENIOR FIN.
EXECUTIvES, Aug. 1, 1997, at 4 (stating employees continue to invest heavily
in employer securities despite the fact that employers have "stepped up efforts
to provide investment education, especially since the adoption of rule 404(c) in
1992").
76. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR INTERPRETIVE BULL. 96-1, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1
(1996). The DOL noted in the bulletin that "many employers have not offered
programs or have only offered limited programs due to uncertainty regarding
the extent to which the provision of investment-related information may be
considered the rendering of 'investment advice" under Section 3(21)(A)(ii) of
ERISA, resulting in fiduciary responsibility and potential liability in
connection with participant-directed investments." Id.
77. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.96-1(d)(4) (2002).
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only 22% of employers provide their employees with access to
professional investment advice,"8 primarily because they fear
liability if the adviser breaches its fiduciary duty to investors."
Recognizing the limitations in the education employers can
provide their employees, as well as their general reluctance to
provide investment advice, Congress is considering legislation
intended to provide more meaningful investment education and
advice to 401(k) plan participants. The Pension Security Act of
2002, which passed the House on April 11, 2002, would allow the
same companies who administer 401(k) plans and sell investment
products to provide investment advice to plan participants, as long
as any conflict of interest is disclosed to participants. It also
clarifies that employers have no fiduciary liability for advice
provided by such advisers as long as the employer prudently
selects the adviser. 80
This approach, however, creates more problems than it solves.
Putting participants "in the hands of people who have a vested
interest in directing them in a particular direction"8 is clearly
dangerous and a number of people have expressed concern about
letting investment product retailers provide investment advice.82
A disclosure requirement is the sole check on the conflict created
78. See Press Release, Rep. John Boehner, Boehner-Hutchinson Dear
Colleague Letter to Senators on the Retirement Security Advice Act (May 13,
2002) (citing Profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America 2001 Investment Advice
Survey, released Jan. 2002). See also Beth Kobliner, Investing in 401(k)'s,
Whose Advice is Best?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, § 3, at 6 (discussing the
current restrictions on giving employees investment advice and citing Profit
Sharing/401(k) Council of America statistic which states that although almost
all plans offer some type of investment education, "only 35 percent of 909
plans surveyed offer specific recommendations about where to invest").
79. See Muir, supra note 60, at 21-22 (describing potential employer
liability for actions of investment advisers).
80. H.R. 3762 107th Cong. (Feb. 14, 2002).
81. 147 CONG. REC. 8189-02, 8196 (Nov. 15, 2001), (statement of Rep.
McDermott). See Muir, supra note 60, at 37 (providing as an example that "if
the adviser also is a member of the firm whose mutual funds are offered as
plan investments, there may be explicit or implicit pressure to steer plan
investors to funds that generate high fees for that mutual fund company").
82. See, e.g., Christiane Bird, Retirement Security Advice Act Draws Mixed
Reactions, DOW JONES NEWS SERVICE, June 25, 2001 (noting that many
oppose allowing investment managers who serve as advisors to pension plans
to recommend their own investment product and not requiring plan sponsor to
monitor the advice provided); Lisa Singhania, Legislation May Affect Mutual
Funds, ASSOCIATED PRESS June 27, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24029657
(citing opponents of a bill who argue that the bill "strips employees of
protections from conflicts of interest by removing the prohibition against
investment advisers recommending products they sell); Fran Hawthorne,
Saving; First Came 401(k)'s Now Some Advice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, § G,
at 2 (discussing the costs associated with investment advisors, noting the
internet is now being used as an advisor, and suggesting advice from
employer-sponsored advisors may not be trustworthy).
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by this proposed legislation."' The fact that the advisors disclose
their conflicts of interest will prove ineffective because they are
essentially the only game in town. If the only advice available is
conflicted advice, participants will either take that conflicted
advice or be no better off than they are now. Moreover, plan
participants are likely to view a service provider selected by the
employer to provide investment advice as carrying an employer
imprimatur (again, the operation of Professor Benarzti's
endorsement effect) meaning that the advice is likely to carry
great weight.
III.

LIMITS OF

ERISA

FIDUCIARY STANDARDS

It is important to understand that the law will not force
participants to make wise plan investment decisions, nor will it
protect them from the consequences of their over-investment in
employer securities.
ERISA does impose some limits on acquisitions of employer
securities by pension plans. ERISA limits the acquisition of
employer securities by defined benefit plans and by employerdirected defined contribution plans to up to 10% of the plans'
assets.'
However, no similar limits apply to acquisitions of
employer securities by participant-directed plans, reflecting
Congress' determination to protect employees only from employer
opportunism rather than from themselves. Since about 65% of
401(k) plans, accounting for 73% of all participants, provide for
participant direction,85 the statutory limitations are not very
meaningful in the current pension plan environment.
That situation is unlikely to change. Senators Boxer and
Corzine introduced legislation on December 18, 2001 that proposed
to limit the amount of employer securities that may be invested in
company stock. Under their proposal, no more than 20% of 401(k)
investments could be in company stock. In addition, the proposed
legislation would have limited the tax deduction for matches made
in company stock in order to discourage the practice.' However, it
became clear that neither a percentage limit nor a provision
83. The proposed legislation imposes on employers only a general obligation

to monitor, not any obligation to monitor specific advice.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1107(a)(2), (b)(2)(B)(ii) (2001). The limit on defined benefit
plan acquisitions of company stock was part of ERISA as originally enacted.
The limit on acquisitions by employer-directed defined contribution plans was
added to the statute effective 1999. When the statute was enacted individual
account plans were exempted from the 10% limit out of recognition for their
"special purpose." Library of Congress, ERISA: Selected Legislative History:
1974 - 1986 at 50-51 (1986).
85. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 401(k) Pension Plans: Extent of
Plans' Investments in Employer Securities and Real Property 9 (Nov. 1997).
86. S. 1838, 107th Cong. (Dec. 18, 2001). See also Oppel, Jr., supra note 16,
at C1.
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discouraging matching contributions in employer stock was
politically viable.87 As a result, Senators Corzine and Boxer
withdrew their legislation in favor of Senator Kennedy's bill that
contains no such limit.' The Pension Security Act of 2002, passed
by the House on April 11, 2002, likewise contains no percentage
limit on the acquisition of employer securities,89 opting instead for
a disclosure/education approach that I have already shown is
doomed to fail.
The law also imposes no standards on participant decisions
with respect to the investment of their plan contributions,
meaning there are no external controls to counter participants'
behavioral tendencies to over-invest in employer securities.
Although exercising control over investment of pension plan assets
is something that by statutory definition makes one a fiduciary, °
and thus, subject to fiduciary standards of prudence and
diversification,9' this does not hold true for participants making
401(k) plan investment decisions.
Section 404(c) of ERISA
explicitly provides that participants who exercise control over the
assets of their defined contribution plan accounts are not deemed
to be fiduciaries by reason of such exercise92 and that no person
who is otherwise a fiduciary to the plan has liability for losses
resulting from the participants' exercise of control.93
Thus,
ERISA's fiduciary standards of prudence and diversification do not
operate here. Although heavy plan investments in a single
security potentially violates both ERISA's prudence and
diversification standards, the effect of section 404(c) is that no one
is liable for what would clearly be a violation if we (consistent with
the statutory definition) labeled the employee a fiduciary.
87. Opposition to the idea of a cap came from many quarters. For a
summary of arguments raised against capping investments in employer
securities, see U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 14, at 4-7. Similar
concerns doomed the proposal to limit the deduction for matches made in
employer securities, most notable the fear that the proposal would discourage
matching contributions.
88. See Press Conference, supra note 55 (endorsing Senator Kennedy's bill,

Sen. Boxer stated "it hits on the issues that Sen. Corzine and I feel so strongly
about, which really are diversification and divestment").
89. See infra note 6 (discussing legislation proposed by Congress).

90.
91.
92.
assets

29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1) (2000). A participant exercises control over the
in his or her individual account for purposes of Section 404 when he or

she receives adequate information concerning investments, is given the
opportunity to make independent investment decisions, and has access to a
broad range of investment alternatives. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2001).

93. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(2) (2000). For a more complete discussion of Section
404(c) requirements and its impact on 401(k) plans see generally Stabile,
supra note 34; JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, Background Information
Relating to the Investment of Retirement Plan Assets in Employer Stock, Feb.

11, 2002, at 7-8.
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Therefore, nothing prevents employees from heavily investing
in employer securities. Many of those who have done so, are
starting to feel the stings of a declining stock market, prompting
them to seek relief from their employers. Indeed, several class
action suits have been filed in the last year or so.94 Let me say a
few words about a couple of the lawsuits currently in progress.
Enron. Anyone who has read the newspaper recently is
aware of the problems that have beset Enron Corporation and the
effect of those problems on the account balances of the company's
401(k) plan participants, about 60% of which was invested in
Enron stock.9 It appears that during at least part of the time that
the company's stock was plummeting, participants were prevented
from moving their plan assets out of the company stock fund and
into less risky alternatives. Enron's explanation for the freeze was
that it was switching plan administrators and the shutdown was
required to allow for an accurate transfer of employee account96
information, a fact that they gave employees notice of in advance.
According to newspaper reports, plan choices were frozen on
October 17, 2001 when Enron stock was trading at $32.20 per
share.97 As the shares lost virtually all of their value, plan
participants lost 70-90% of their retirement assets, and some
participants saw their account balances fall by several hundred
thousand dollars."
According to Enron, participants were
prevented from switching out of company stock only from October
26 through November 12, 2001" during which time the stock went

94. See Christine Dugas, Workers Sue Companies in 401(k) Disputes, USA
TODAY, Mar. 7, 2002, at 1B (noting recent filings of lawsuits against Providian

Financial, Nortel Networks, and Global Crossing).
95. See Gottesdiener Law Firm, supra note 63 (referring to Gottsediener's
statement that Enron had encouraged employees to "load-up" on company
stock).
96. See Shannon Buggs, Labor Dept. Examines Enron Retirement Plan, THE
HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Dec. 6, 2001, at Al (noting employees received notice of

the freeze, but no explanation about the over $1 billion charge attributed to
Enron's investment partnerships). See also Judith Schoolman, Enron Says
401k Freeze Was Planned, DAILY NEWS (New York), Dec. 15, 2001, at 18
(writing about Enron 401(k) freeze).
97. Retirement Plans: Post Enron 401(k) Strategies, HRFOCUS, Mar. 2002,
at 1. See also Enron Debacle Will Force Clean Up of Company Stock Use in
D.C. Plans, D.C. PLAN INVESTING, Dec. 2001, at 1 (noting Enron's offer to

match company stock accompanied a prohibition on conversion until
participant reached the age of 50).
98. See Buggs, supra note 96, at Al (noting employees received notice of the

freeze, but no explanation about the over $1 billion charge attributed to
Enron's investment partnerships). See also Labor Opens ERISA Investigation
of EnronAssistance to Dislocated Workers Also Begins Today, U.S. NEWSWIRE,

Dec. 5, 2001 (quoting Department of Labor Secretary Chao's statement:
"Enron's employees have gotten the short end of the stick in the sudden
collapse of this company").
99. See Stabile, supra note 5, at 2-6.
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from
$15.40
to
$9.00.00
Employees
dispute
Enron's
characterization of the time period and say they were prevented
from switching accounts for a longer period.'0 '
The staggering losses have led to an investigation by the DOL
into the steps the company took shortly before its collapse to
prohibit employees from making transactions with their 401(k)
plan assets. It has also led to class-action lawsuits on behalf of
plan participants alleging that the company was promoting
company stock and matching employee contributions with
company stock at a time when it knew the stock was overvalued.
The suit alleges that the company schemed to pump up the price of
the stock artificially and violated its fiduciary duty to employees
by failing to act in their best interests by, among other things,
withholding from participants key information regarding the
company's financial situation. The suit also alleges violations
based on the suspension of plan trading during a critical period of
plummeting Enron stock value, preventing employees from
stemming their losses by switching out of the employer stock fund.
Lucent Technologies. During an 18-month period, from the
end of 1999 to the middle of 2001, the stock of Lucent Technologies
plummeted over 90%.1o° A large number of Lucent employees were
heavily invested in the company's stock, resulting in significant
plan losses." 3 (Some employees saw their account balances shrink
by $200,000.)' ° A class-action suit filed at the end of July 2001
alleges that Lucent executives tried to persuade company
employees to invest their plan assets in company stock, even
though they knew the company was in serious financial trouble.' °'
100. See id. at 2-7. But see Jay Hancock, 'Fixing' the 401(k) Could Make It

Worse, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 6, 2002, at 1C (noting although the decrease
during the blackout period was substantial, it was "relatively minor" compared
with the ultimate result).
101. See Hancock, supra note 100, at IC (noting that Enron had a problem

with accounting and honesty).
102. See James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, & Andrew
Metrick, Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, ParticipantDecisions,
and the Path of Least Resistance, Nov. 9, 2001, at 28, available at

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/ laibson/papers/plr.pdf
103. See Christine Williamson & Arleen Jacobius, 401(k) ParticipantsGo to
Court: Lucent Sued Over Company Stock Option, PENSIONS AND
INVESTMENTS,

Aug. 20, 2001, at 1 (comparing the Lucent suit with First

Union Corp. and AirTouch suits).
104. See Danny Hakim, Former Workers at Lucent See Nest Eggs Vanish,
Too, N.Y. TIMES, Aug 29, 2001, at Al (recounting personal losses by Lucent
employees).
105. See Lucent's 401(k) Crash, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, Sept. 3, 2001,

at 10 (noting that Ikon Office Solutions employees have made similar
allegations against their e~iployer). Ikon's stock fell from $51.63 in early 1997
to $2.81 in October 2001. The Ikon lawsuit was recently settled. See Ikon
Settles ERISA Litigation, supra note 56 (reporting on the Ikon settlement

agreement).
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The suit alleges that company executives knew the stock was an
inappropriate plan investment since year-end 1999.
These will not be easy lawsuits for plaintiffs 10 6 for several
reasons. First, plan design decisions, such as requiring that
matches be made in employer securities, are not fiduciary
decisions, but settlor decisions.' 7 This means that an employer's
decisions to offer an employer stock fund as an investment
alternative and to match employee contributions in company stock
are not subject to ERISA's fiduciary standards. Because such
decisions are not fiduciary ones, they need not be made in the best
interests of plan participants but may suit the company's business
needs. Thus, the decision to require that a company match be
made in employer securities is probably not one that can be
challenged. So long as the requirements of 404(c) regarding
investments in employer securities" and frequency of investment
changes are met,"°9 it will be difficult to argue that the plan
sponsor acted inappropriately.
What about an allegation that a company should have ceased
to permit employees to invest in company stock or that it should
have refrained from continuing to match in company stock due to a
downturn in the value of the company's stock? Plan fiduciaries do,
after all, have an obligation to prudently select and to monitor a
106. One commentator characterized the plaintiffs' claims in these lawsuits
as "fairly creative claims of violation of fiduciary duty." See Oppel Jr., supra
note 16, at Cl (citing James Delaplane of the American Benefits Council).
107. See generally, Akers v. Palmer, 71 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 1995); Malia v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 23 F.3d 828 (3d Cir. 1994). By allowing a company and its
officers and directors to act as fiduciaries, ERISA accepts that employers will
act in a dual capacity, as both fiduciary to the plan and as employer. 29
U.S.C. § 1108(c)(3) (2000). Only when and to the extent that the employer
functions in a fiduciary capacity are ERISA duties implicated. Other decisions
an employer makes are viewed to be employer, or "settlor" decisions, not
subject to ERISA. "[Tihe mere fact that a company has named itself as pension

plan administrator or trustee does not restrict it from pursuing reasonable
business behavior in negotiations concerning pension benefits not otherwise
affected by the requirements of ERISA." United Indep. Flight Officers, Inc. v.

United Air Lines, Inc., 756 F.2d 1262, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1985). ERISA is not
intended to "prohibit an employer from acting in accordance with its interests
as an employer when not administering the plan or investing its assets."
Hlinka v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 863 F.2d 279, 285 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting
Hickman v. Tosco Corp., 840 F.2d 563 (8th Cir. 1988)).
108. Section 404(c) specifically contemplates that a 401(k) plan may include

an employer stock fund as an investment option so long as certain conditions
are met. These conditions include requirements that the securities are
qualifying employer securities as defined in ERISA, that they be publicly
traded and traded with sufficient frequency and in sufficient volume to assure
that participant directions to buy and sell shares can be executed promptly,
that participants receive all information provided to other shareholders of the
company, and that voting, tender and similar rights be passed through to
participants. 29 C.F.R § 2550.404C-l(d)(2)(i)(E)(4)(iii-vi)(2001).
109. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404C-l(b)(2)(vi) (2001).
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401(k)'s plan investment options."' Nonetheless, these claims are
also unlikely to succeed.
A fiduciary's duty to monitor 401(k) plan investment options
may mean, for example, that a fiduciary has an obligation to
change from one growth mutual fund to another growth mutual
fund that appears to have better long-term prospects, or a duty to
secure a new guaranteed investment contract that provides more
favorable terms to plan participants than an existing one. It is
difficult, however, to translate that duty into an obligation to
remove a company stock fund in the face of declining stock value.
The fact that stock values fluctuate all of the time, combined with
the fact that 401(k) plans generally have fairly long-term horizons,
means that the plan sponsor should be justified in continuing to
make available a company stock investment option unless the
fiduciary has information leading it to reasonably believe the
company has no future prospects.'11
Thus, in most cases, a
decision to retain an employer securities stock fund is likely to be
viewed as consistent with ERISA's fiduciary standards.
In addition, regardless of the standard applied to the
employer's decision to continue to allow an employer stock fund,
participants in most cases are free to switch at least their own
contributions in and out of an employer stock fund virtually at
will.112 That means that the cause of any plan account loss will be
viewed to be the participant's failure to move the stock to a
different, less risky alternative. Most employers will be able to
show that employees were warned of the dangers of lack of
diversification and were told that employers were not providing
them with investment advice. Short of being able to demonstrate
actual misrepresentation on the part of plan fiduciaries acting in a
fiduciary capacity,"' plaintiffs will not have an easy time in these

110. The DOL's § 404(c) regulations make clear that compliance with the

regulations shields the employer from liability for losses caused by the
participants' exercise of control over their plan accounts, but that the

employer is not relieved from its duty of prudence. 29 C.F.R § 2550.404C1(b)(2)(i) (2001).

111. Such situations may arise and may cause a prudent fiduciary to cease
offering a company stock fund. For example, Federal Mogul, an auto parts
maker, ceased offering a company stock fund in its 401(k) plan in July 2001,
due to a sharp decline in the price of the company's shares resulting from
concerns about potential asbestos liability. In October, the company filed for
bankruptcy. See Oppel Jr., supra note 16, at C1.
112. See Purcell, supra note 11, at 3. (noting that in the case of Enron,

approximately 89% of the plan's investment in company stock was attributable
to participants' own contributions and 10% to the company match).
113. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 498-505 (1996) (noting that
misrepresentations by plan sponsor acting in a fiduciary capacity violate

ERISA's fiduciary duties). "Varity suggested that statements about a
company's financial future generally will not be viewed as fiduciary ones.
However, Varity did not focus on a plan in which employees were investing in
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suits.
I emphasize communications from fiduciaries acting in a
fiduciary capacity because 10b-5 type allegations that the company
made false and misleading public statements are not going to give
rise to a viable ERISA suit."' Allegations have been made, for
example, that Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay "urged his employees
to scoop up the company's stock at what he called 'bargain' prices
even as he sold many of his own shares.""' It remains to be seen
whether a court will decide that such statements were made in a
fiduciary capacity and therefore give rise to ERISA liability.
What about the decision of a plan fiduciary to continue to
match in company stock, in accord with the terms of a plan? In In
re Ikon Office Solutions Securities Litigation,"6 a federal district
court refused to grant a defendants' motion to dismiss based on
their claim that they could not be held liable for requiring or
continuing to require that matching contributions be invested only
in employer stock. Citing the "presumption" language of the Third
Circuit's decision in Moench v. Robertson,"7 the court said that
even though the plaintiff bore a heavy burden, the plaintiff must

company stock. Thus, under the reasoning in Varity, it would not be
surprising for a court to find that statements about a company's future
prospectus, if they are made in the context of discussions about the company's
benefit plans and by persons whom employees would perceive to be acting in
the capacity of plan administrator as well as employer, may be viewed as
subject to ERISA's fiduciary standards." Stabile, supra note 5, at 6-4.
114. Even if a communication is viewed as being benefits-related, it still
must be ascertained whether the person making it is a fiduciary. Although
the strictest view would be that there can be no violation of ERISA's fiduciary
standards where the communications in question were made by persons who
were not plan fiduciaries, some courts have applied an apparent-authority
principle, suggesting that if statements are made by persons who, because of
their position and duties, participants might reasonably be expected to rely,
there can be a fiduciary breach. See generally Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 226 F.3d 574, 590 (7th Cir. 2000); Taylor v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 49
F.3d 982, 988-89 (3d Cir. 1995). Sometimes courts are even more lenient,
finding fiduciary liability based on statements by "management personnel" or
simply the "employer." Examples can be found in Drennan v.Gen. Motors
Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 249-52 (6th Cir. 1992) which found "management
personnel" statements regarding a window plan to be fiduciary acts. Likewise,
the court in Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d. 117 (2d Cir. 1997) found
liability based on "employer" statements, without identifying who was
speaking as fiduciary. Id. at 124-25.
115. See Patrice Hill, Targets Problems Exposed by Enron Employees' Losses,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2002, at A3 (noting that Enron Chairman Kenneth Lay
urged his employees to invest in the company's stock even though he sold
many of his shares). See also John J. Sweeney, Enron: Big Lies, Big Scandal,
PROVIDENCE JOURNAL-BULLETIN, May 14, 2002 (noting that as late as
October, 2001 Lay assured employees that the company was in good shape and
had no plans for any significant employee lay-offs).
116. 191 F.R.D. 457, 462 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
117 62 F. 3d 553 (3rd Cir. 1995)
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have the opportunity to overcome the presumption that fiduciaries
acted properly in continuing to match in company stock. In
Moench, the court suggested that ESOP fiduciaries are "entitled to
a presumption that [they] acted consistently with ERISA"
standards when they invest in company stock.'18 It is not easy to
overcome that presumption, and, in the ESOP context, courts have
not been quick to hold fiduciaries liable for failing to sell employer
stock that has drastically fallen in value. 9 The Ikon decision
suggests that courts will examine a 401(k) plan fiduciary's decision
to continue to invest matching contributions in company stock the
same way the decision of an ESOP trustee is analyzed.
Thus, the law does very little to protect plan participants
from the consequences of their decisions to continue to invest in
employer securities. 2 °
CONCLUSION

401(k) plans have replaced defined benefit plans as the
primary means through which employers provide retirement
benefits to their employees. While many praise this shift as a
positive response to the needs and desires of an increasingly
mobile work force, different risks have been created. These
include low participation and contribution rates and the failure by
many2 employees to leave funds in 401(k) plans when they change
jobs.1 1
Over-investment in employer securities represents another
significant problem with 401(k) plans. Given the freedom to do so,
participants invest disproportionately in the stock of their
employers. They do so because of various behavioral tendencies
that are not susceptible to change through increased education
efforts. Not only can they not be counted on their own to make
sound investment decisions, but the law does nothing to force
them to do so. We have thus created the risk that large numbers
of employees will retire with account balances that will provide
them with insufficient savings to support them during their
retirement.
Congress seems intent on preserving individual
freedom to invest in employer securities with no limits, even at
such a dangerous cost.

118. Id. at 571.

119. See Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1459-60 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that
the Sixth Circuit found no ERISA violation where a fiduciary failed to sell
stock that had drastically fallen in value).
120. The specific Enron situation presents a different situation. A decision
by the plan fiduciary charged with administering the plan to freeze
movements in and out of the employer stock fund is judged under a
heightened standard. However, whether there is a winnable lawsuit here is
open to question. Stabile, supra note 5, at 7-6, 7-8.
121. I discuss these problems in Stabile, supra note 35.

